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I. INTRODUCTION
Upon first glance, adverse possession of water rights in a system of
prior appropriation seems somewhat counterintuitive. If one can simply usurp the "first in time, first in right" system, then a water right
would become valueless.' Colorado grappled with this confusion as
early as the turn of the last century, and the notion of adverse possession of water evolved with the doctrine of prior appropriation.2 The
Colorado Supreme Court provided clarification in Meadow Ditch and
IrrigationCompany v. ParkDitch and Reservoir Company.3 A rival claimant
can, in fact, establish adverse possession of water diverted from the
stream as long as the adverse possessor satisfies the statutory provisions.4 Such adverse possession is possible because it is hostile to the
priority owner; not to the stream, junior appropriators, or the public.5

1. The general theory behind the doctrine of prior appropriation is that the first
one to place water to beneficial use has the first priority; in other words, first in time,
first in right. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
2. Lower Latham Ditch Company v. The Louden Irrigating Canal Company, 27
Colo. 267, 273-74 (1900).
3. Meadow Ditch and Irrigation Co. v. Park Ditch and Reservoir Co., 130 Colo.
537, 539 (1954).
4. Id. See also In re Water Rights of V-Heart Ranch, Inc., 690 P.2d 1271 (Colo.
1984) (affirming the adverse possession of water rights).
5. Meadow Ditch v. Park Ditch, 130 Colo. at 540.
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Adverse possession of water involves many areas of law, obviously
including property law and statutory limitation of actions. Nonetheless, the Colorado Court of Appeals determined in May 2006 that only
the water court has competent jurisdiction to entertain claims of adverse possession of water.6 According to statute, water courts have exclusive jurisdiction over "water matters."7 To many, this decision came
as a surprise. It merely demonstrates, however, that the concept of
adverse possession of water rights is still evolving and requires further
clarification from the Colorado Supreme Court to reconcile adverse
possession and the doctrine of prior appropriation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE PARTIES

Ralph Archuleta and Ted Gomez are both record owners of portions of three irrigation ditches in south central Colorado. These
ditches, the Manzanares Ditch No. 1, priority 26, the Archuleta Ditch,
priority 30, and the Manzanares Ditch No. 2, priority 31, all draw water
from the Huerfano River, which begins near Blanca Peak in the Sangre
de Cristo Mountains and eventually flows into the Arkansas River
downstream of Pueblo. Both parties have rights to the river dating
back to the 1960s. Archuleta's father, Lupe Archuleta, deeded the interests to Ralph in 1991 by a personal representative's deed. Lupe
Archuleta acquired the rights in 1967. Gomez obtained his rights in
1968.
B. THE FACTS
Beginning in 1968, Ted Gomez acquired water rights to portions of
the three ditches at issue. Since such time, Gomez used the water for
irrigation purposes, maintained the headgates, and contributed funds
for cleaning and repairs to the ditches. The evidence sustained at the
trial court indicates that neither Archuleta, nor his predecessors, used
their water rights from 1968 until 2003 or 2004. Archuleta argued that
he gave his uncle, Felipe Archuleta, who lives in the vicinity, permission to use his water rights, thereby maintaining his ownership right.
Felipe Archuleta testified, however, that he only began using the water
around 1999. Nonetheless, Archuleta argued that Gomez was interfering with his rights. Furthermore, Archuleta asserted that Gomez's interference caused damage to his personal property, including firewood, 40-year-old siding, and tools.

6.
7.

Archuleta v. Gomez, 140 P.3d 281 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
C.R.S. 37-92-203(1).
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C. THE PROCEDURE
On July 27, 2004, the dispute between Archuleta and Gomez came
before the district court for Huerfano County in Walsenburg, Colorado. At the trial level, the court found that the statute of limitations
barred all of Archuleta's claims. Through "actual, adverse, hostile,
open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous use of the water for the
prescribed statutory period," Gomez established ownership rights
through adverse possession.8 Furthermore, the trial court found that
Archuleta failed to demonstrate any damages resulting from Gomez's
alleged interference sufficient to sustain his burden of proof. The
court found any damage that occurred to Archuleta's personal property was de minimis. Archuleta then appealed the district court's decision to the Colorado Court of Appeals.
HI. ARCHULETA V. GOMEZ
A. QUESTIONS RAISED
The principal question raised sua sponte by the Colorado Court of
Appeals concerned the trial court's jurisdiction to hear this matter.
According to the Court of Appeals, the water court has exclusive jurisdiction over "water matters" and has authority to quantify "an existing
beneficial use of water," establish a priority date for the water right,
and confirm "pre-existing beneficial uses."9 "Actions to determine the
legal right to use water are water maters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the water courts," whereas actions to determine the ownership of
a water right are matters for the district court. ° Actions to determine
ownership include, for example, "interpretation of deeds, chains of
title, quiet title proceedings, real estate transfers, dissolution proceedings, and foreclosures."" The Court of Appeals applied these principles to the facts of the case to answer the jurisdictional question.
B. THE COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS HOLDING

The court of appeals ultimately determined that adverse possession
primarily concerned the legal right to use water, not the ownership of
a water right. 2 Because an adverse possession case necessarily involves
"both the enforcement of a water right and an assertion that the right
to use the water should be terminated and awarded to another based
8.

Archuleta v. Gomez, No. 2003 CV 2 (Dist. Ct. Huerfano County, Colo. Sept.

15, 2004).
9. Archuleta v. Gomez, 140 P.3d at 284. See Humphrey v. Sw. Dev. Co., 734 P.2d
637 (Colo. 1987).
10. Archuleta v. Gomez, 140 P.3d at 284.
11. Id. at 285.
12. Id. at 286.
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on beneficial use of the water," the water court is the only appropriate
court to hear such a case. 3 The court found that only the water court
can provide an adequate consideration of water law principles and a
sufficient comparison with property law principles. Consequently, the
district court lacked jurisdiction and the court of appeals vacated the
decision regarding adverse possession.
The court of appeals affirmed, however, the district court's decision with regards to the damages to Archuleta's personal property.
Finding that these damage claims were not ancillary issues directly affecting the water rights, the district court did have proper jurisdiction. 4 The court had no reason to find the trial court's findings clearly
erroneous.
IV. CBA WATER LAW SECTION SEPTEMBER LUNCHEON
The Water Law Section of the Colorado Bar Association ("CBA")
hosts a monthly luncheon that addresses current issues in the practice
of water law. For the month of September, Moye White LLP, hosted
the luncheon, which addressed Archuleta v. Gomez. Henry "Hank"
Worley, the attorney for Gomez, presented his perspective on the
court's decision and its implications to a relatively large audience of
approximately thirty CBA members. Worley, a graduate from Colorado College and the University of Colorado School of Law, is a shareholder in the law firm of MacDougall, Woldridge, and Worley, P.C. in
Colorado Springs. Worley presented for thirty minutes and then
opened up the floor for questions from both the audience present and
those listening from one of the Colorado Bar Association's nine regional locations across the state.
In a light-hearted effort to explain the "unfortunate" outcome in
Archuleta v. Gomez, Worley started his presentation by proposing that
the location of his practice and the "remote" locale of his cases must be
disconnecting him from the mainstream water law practice and procedure. When the audience failed to respond with laughter, he concluded that the silence was implicit evidence that his proposal was, in
fact, correct.
Turning to the case, Worley laid out the facts as he saw them. Gomez had come to his office, seeking representation in an action filed
by Archuleta to enjoin Gomez from interfering with his water rights in
ditches stemming from the Huerfano River. Worley filed an answer on
behalf of Gomez, alleging limitation of actions as an affirmative defense. Worley explained that limitation of actions, by its nature, implicitly includes an adverse possession claim. The District Court for
Huerfano County agreed, finding Archuleta's claim barred by the fact
13.
14.

Id. at 287.
Id. at 285.
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that Gomez had adversely possessed the water rights in question. On
appeal, much to Worley's dismay, the Court of Appeals vacated the
district court's decision on jurisdictional grounds that adverse possession of water rights is a matter for the water court, not the district
court. Neither Worley nor the opposing attorney raised this issue.
Worley proceeded to discuss his difficulties with this decision. First
of all, he contested the court of appeals' determination that adverse
possession constitutes a "water matter" pursuant to C.R.S. § 37-92301(1). He cited C.R.S. § 37-92-101 and 37-92-301(2) as enumerating
what constitutes water matters, and argued that the court's interpretation did not align with these statutory provisions. Secondly, Worley
argued that this decision, which establishes that the water court is the
only court with jurisdiction to determine title in an adverse possession
case, contradicts the 1959 Colorado Supreme Court decision which
declared that water court decrees of water rights do not establish title. 15
Worley also discussed his confusion over the language used in the
opinion. He found the terms "grant" and "termination" to be inappropriate, or at least perplexing descriptions of the process of adverse
possession. Lastly, Worley questioned why the court went into a discussion on abandonment and forfeiture of water rights, as neither attorney raised those issues.
During the question and answer period, members of the audience
raised several interesting points. In particular, one attorney asked
whether the limitation of actions affirmative defense used by Worley is
sufficient for future cases, or whether a counter-claim for adverse possession is necessary. After consultation via conference call with the
opposing attorney from the case, Worley explained that since the court
of appeals did not reach this issue, it is still unclear. Worley concluded
by suggesting that any attorneys who lost previous cases in district
courts regarding adverse possession of water should seek "another bite
at the apple," because the decisions necessarily are invalid since the
district court apparently lacked jurisdiction. On a final note, Worley
advised the attorneys to file adverse possession of water rights cases in
water court in the meantime.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Many questions remain regarding the adverse possession of water
rights in a system of prior appropriation. First and foremost, is the
water court the proper venue for adverse possession disputes? Even
though the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over "water
cases involving priorities or adjudications," it decided the appropriate
venue for the adverse possession of water rights. 16 For purposes of de15.
16.

See Saunders v. Spina, 140 Colo. 317, 324 (Colo. 1959).
Archuleta v. Gomez, 140 P.3d at 284.
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termining what "water matters" includes, clarification as to the distinction between the classifications of the "legal right to use water" and the
"ownership of water" is necessary. Hopefully the Colorado Supreme
Court will provide guidance.
MariaE. Hohn

